Dimitrios Skaftouros (“Skaftouros”) was wanted in Greece on murder charges. A Magistrate Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York certified him as extraditable, but the decision was overturned by a District Court judge who denied the extradition.
The Government appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the Judge’s decision, re-ordering Skaftouros extradited. The Appeals Court said the judge had placed impermissible burdens of proof on the U.S. Government, and improperly engaged in an inquiry into the requesting country’s compliance with its own laws:
“We reaffirm that a court. . . may review the demanding government’s compliance with its own laws only insofar as it is necessary to ensure that the both the federal extradition law and the relevant portions of the extradition treaty have been met.”
In other language recited below, the opinion makes it crystal clear that when it comes to extradition, the law “. . . gives to the demanding country advantages most uncommon to ordinary civil and criminal litigation:”
1. “At an extradition hearing, the judicial officer’s inquiry is confined to whether a valid treaty exists; whether the crime charged is covered by the relevant treaty; and whether the evidence marshaled in support of the complaint for extradition is sufficient under the applicable standard of proof.”
2. “An extradition hearing is ‘not to be regarded as . . . a final trial by which the prisoner could be convicted or acquitted of the crime charged against him.’”
3. “[It is] not the occasion for an adjudication of guilt or innocence,”
4. “Orders of extradition are [unique]. They embody no judgment on the guilt or innocence of the accused but serve only to insure that his culpability will be determined in another and, in this instance, a foreign forum.”
5. “What is at issue in the proceeding is not punishability but prosecutability.”
6. “[I] n choosing between conflicting interpretations of a treaty obligation, a narrow and restricted construction is to be avoided. . . .” In other words, give the benefit of the doubt to the requesting country.
7. “Considerations which should govern the diplomatic relations between nations and the good faith of treaties require that obligations should be liberally [and charitably] construed so as to . . . [promote the friendships of the countries and] secure reciprocity.”
8. “. . . [I] f a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the rights [of the requesting country] and the other enlarging it, the more liberal construction is to be preferred.”
9. “It is not the business of our courts to assume responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation.”
10. “In addition to principles of international comity, the reluctance of our courts to examine foreign law in extradition proceedings is founded in principles of judicial modesty. . . .”
11. “U.S. courts are strongly discouraged from reviewing whether the demanding country has complied with its own law . . . .”
12. “Technical objections to the demanding nation’s compliance with its own law are particularly disfavored.”
These principles are not peculiar to U.S. law. They guide all courts no matter where they are located. Perhaps this will give Colombians more solace. They often complain that their Court refuses to judge the sufficiency of evidence. The fact is their Court is not legally authorized to do so.
David@davidzapp.com